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Fullan, M. Change leader: Learning to do what matters most. Heifetz, R. Leadership on the line. Staying alive through the dangers of leading. May, H. Concerning women, considering children. Wellington: NZCA.

the changing fortunes of childcare Manual

Nuttall, J. Report of the advisory group on early learning AGEL. Wellington, New Zealand: Ministry of Education. Ord, K. Consultants at the Lithuanian Energy Institute concluded that current costs of electricity, including imports, would be 4—10 Lithuanian cents 1. In , however, Poland announced that it was going to re-enter the nuclear arena. In response over 60, submissions were received from neighboring Germany; the results are due in the summer of Officials have revised the planning in the meantime targeting —23 for the startup of the first reactor. Financing of the ambitious project remains unclear and public opinion is highly uncertain.

It was foreseen that the first units will come into operation around , with the last ones before A tender for construction and financing was to be opened in the end of This is primarily due to the expected growth of natural gas as an energy source, including domestic shale gas.

It is also responsible for supervising works related to nuclear energy and radioactive waste projects. The first two reactors would be planned to be online in ten years and then two more per year until Saudi Arabia has very large electricity expansion projects.


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A renewable-and-nuclear policy statement is expected later in However, these choices are not only about energy and economics. Turkey has a decades long history of attempting to build a nuclear power program, starting in the early s. In , the government presented a revised nuclear initiative and announced plans for up to 4. The plans met with large-scale local protests. The following year, Turkey approved a bill introducing new laws on the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, which led in March to a revised tender process for the Akkuyu plant.

Accordingly, the negotiations about the electricity price are difficult and have been ongoing for years. Therefore the licensing process will be heavily reliant on the reactor vendor. Construction was slated to begin in , and the turnkey project will be owned and operated by the state utility Electricity of Vietnam EVN , with operations beginning in Vietnam has also signed an intergovernmental agreement with Japan for the construction of a second nuclear power plant in Ninh Thuan province, with its two reactors to come on line in — The agreement calls for assistance in conducting feasibility studies for the project, low-interest and preferential loans, technology transfer and training of human resources, and cooperation in the waste treatment and stable supply of materials for the whole life of the project.

However, the State owned Electricity of Vietnam Corporation, which is to be the sole investor in the four reactors, is still preparing the feasibilty studies. This would require the operation of four reactors, two between Abu Dhabi city and Ruwais, one at Al Fujayrah, and possibly one at As Sila.

In July , a site-preparation license and a limited construction license were granted for four reactors at a single site at Barakah, 53 kilometers along the coast from Ruwais. There has been a clear global trend towards increasing construction times since the beginning of the nuclear age. National building programs were faster in the early years of nuclear power. The only unit that started up in the first half of , a Chinese reactor, took 5. Worldwide, however, it took an average of The reasons for gradually increasing construction times are not well understood.

It is clear that continuously increasing safety requirements and, in some countries, lengthy legal cases due to public opposition have played a role. While growing system complexity as a consequence of the previous conditions is also likely to have affected construction times and costs.

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Most, but not all of the nuclear countries have experienced this symptom. The latest generation of operating units provides an illustration of this. Average construction time was 9. There are significant differences between the nine countries that started up reactors during that period. Not a single unit was started up in the Western world during that period. Construction times over the past decade were most impressive in Japan and South Korea with 4. China reached an average of just under six years, ranging from 4. Iran holds the negative record. All of the 42 remaining units were started within the last five years or have yet to reach their projected start-up date, making it difficult to assess whether they are on schedule.

The two key markets these claims seemed to have opened up were the U. The present chapter looks at whether the U. Analyzing which kinds of organizations published which costs at what dates reveals that the low early estimates were by vendors or their surrogates. But in the late s, as commercial discussions developed for many proposed U.

That is, when the vendors actually had to take much or all of the price risk themselves, so they had an incentive to bid honest prices rather than seductive but ephemeral dreams, the quoted nuclear construction cost soared by several- to manifold, to levels that are far, often several or many times, higher than the observed market prices of available carbon-free alternatives notably efficient use, combined-heat-and-power, onshore wind power, and, in some cases, even modern photovoltaics.

Thus at the order of cost revealed in the marketplace in recent years, new nuclear power plants are amongst the most expensive generation options available and, despite a substantial rise in gas prices in most regions, far more expensive than gas and renewable options such as onshore wind. Whilst the cost curve for renewables is generally downwards, nuclear costs, as throughout the 60 year history of nuclear power are still on an upward trend, especially as lessons from Fukushima are identified and incorporated into reactor designs.

Deriving a full estimate of the cost of a kWh of electricity from a nuclear power plant is an immensely complex process requiring a large number of assumptions. Many of these are based on little or no practical experience of the processes involved, such as disposal of intermediate and high-level wastes and the decommissioning of retired nuclear power plants.

However, from a corporate point of view and using conventional project appraisal techniques, there are just three variables that will largely determine the cost of nuclear power: the cost of construction, the cost of capital and the reliability. These three variables determine the fixed cost element of a kWh of nuclear electricity, which is normally more than 70 percent of the total cost of a kWh of nuclear electricity. This is particularly important for waste disposal and decommissioning but it also means that the economics of nuclear power is, all things being equal, relatively insensitive to assumed plant lifetime but is particularly sensitive to reliability in the early years of operation.

This is calculated as the kWh produced by the plant in a given period as a percentage of the kWh that would have been produced had the plant operated uninterrupted at its maximum power rating. Typically, the nuclear industry has forecast the nuclear power plants would achieve load factors of 85 percent or more. In practice relatively few plants have achieved this level of reliability over a significant period of time and in , the worldwide average load factor was 60 percent with some plants achieving good levels of reliability but others performing very poorly.

Reliability is less uncertain than it was and the worldwide average is now about 70 percent with some plants tending to do considerably better than the average. A high level of reliability of nuclear plants is not guaranteed, especially for new untested designs, but the risk of poor performance might be less than in the past. As noted above, construction costs are highly uncertain with little prospect in the next few years that estimating accurate construction costs will become any easier.

For the purposes of analysis and comparison, costs should exclude the financing cost during the construction process but include the cost of the first fuel charge.

In other words, overnight costs should be clearly distinguished from total costs. In the past, the cost of capital was not subject to much debate in forecasts of nuclear power costs.

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This was because electricity was then a monopoly business under which the owner of the power plants could pass on to consumers whatever costs were incurred. This meant that while nuclear power was clearly a very risky investment because of its poor record of plant being built to time and cost and operating reliably, this risk was generally entirely borne by customers. For financiers, nuclear power was a low risk loan because electricity is a vital purchase and consumers nearly always paid their bills. This meant the cost of finance—rightly or wrongly—was also assumed to be low in developed countries.

In developing countries with unstable economies and currencies, finance often has been problematic. As soon as the assumption of cost pass-through no longer held, either because regulators no longer allowed whatever costs were incurred to be passed through as in the U. It seems highly likely that if there is no assurance that regulators will allow cost pass through or the nuclear plant will have to survive in a genuinely competitive market, finance will not be available or prohibitively expensive.

The relative proportions of debt and equity vary but typically equity is significantly more expensive than debt. If a project is financed by 60 percent debt at a real interest rate of 5 percent and 40 percent equity at a real interest rate of 10 percent, the Weighted Average Cost of Capital WACC is 7 percent.

Moreover, if real inflation-adjusted construction costs escalate over time, as they have tended to do virtually worldwide, longer construction means more cost escalation, also compounding. The combined effect of these two phenomena in U. Other costs such as waste disposal and decommissioning are expected to be huge, on the order of billions of dollars per reactor, and are highly uncertain because of the relative lack of experience of these processes, especially if many reactors must be decommissioned at once, straining limited technical resources.

For example, it is often assumed, as in the U. Under conventional accounting procedures, the owner of the plant effectively puts aside a sum of money now and it is assumed this money will earn interest until it is required to pay for decommissioning. In practice, the funds are accumulated through what is effectively a surcharge on the price of electricity, although in some countries they may be not set aside at all but spent for other purposes.

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For this method of provisioning to give a high level of confidence that sufficient funds are available to carry out decommissioning when a future generation whose decision it will be on timing, not the current generation decides to carry out the task, the following conditions will have to be fulfilled:.

Funds are also placed in very low risk investments—inevitably, this means the interest rate will be correspondingly low—to minimize the risk of failure of the investments made. This best practice partly addresses the first risk but addressing the other risks, where possible at all, would require additional safeguards, for example, expensive financial instruments that would be guaranteed to make up any shortfall in funds. It is not clear whether such instruments would be available and credible, nor what their cost would be.

At that time, the most recent order for a nuclear power plant not subsequently cancelled was placed in The Bush government believed that new nuclear power plants were competitive with any other form of generation including gas and all that was needed to re-start ordering was to provide subsidies to allow the construction of a handful of demonstration plants perhaps three projects that would show that the issues that had led to the collapse of ordering in the U.

The expectation at the time of the launch of the program was that the first plants would come on line by This insurance was to be paid if delays not the fault of the licensee slow the licensing of the plant. The key subsidy was the Federal loan guarantees which allowed the developers to borrow at interest rates comparable to the Treasury rates.

In , four of the projects were shortlisted for loan guarantees. Not by coincidence, the two projects in competitive markets are highly unlikely to go ahead even with loan guarantees.

Federal loan guarantees require the payment of a fee that reflects the riskiness of the project. The fee for the Calvert Cliffs plant was reported to be As a result, the NRC refused permission for the project to go ahead. A large number of potential projects quickly emerged with about 23 substantial proposals with a total of 36 reactors projected. The optimism quickly waned as estimated costs escalated at an alarming rate, the required Federal budget for loan guarantees skyrocketed, generic design reviews took much longer to complete than expected and natural-gas prices fell.

Many of the projects made little significant progress. Only the AP has received full generic design approval. The Vogtle site is where two reactors were completed in the s which suffered some of the largest cost escalations of any project.